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Despite having a set of well-intended tobacco control policies since 2003, the production and 
consumption of tobacco in Bangladesh have increased. This paper explains why the tobacco 
control policies in Bangladesh failed to deliver their intended outcomes. Using a combined 
framework of political economy and policy implementation analysis, this study examines the 
information collected from primary and secondary sources. Based on the findings, the paper 
argues that the game of interests among the stakeholders have made the state institutions 
inactive and ineffective. Lack of political commitment and politics of interests have failed the 
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Tobacco Control Politics in Bangladesh 
Preface: A Puzzle 
After signing an international agreement on tobacco control in 2003, Bangladesh enacted a 
set of policies to control tobacco. The main objectives of these policies were to cease the 
cultivation and production of tobacco, to reduce the consumption of tobacco products and to 
improve public health. Ironically, studies show that in the last twelve years since the policies 
have taken place, the cultivation, production, and consumption of tobacco have increased. 
This dissertation asks the question: why did the tobacco control policies in Bangladesh fail to 
achieve their intended outcomes? 
Civil Society Organisations welcomed Government intervention in the tobacco market. The 
Parliament passed an anti-tobacco Act in 2005 and the Government immediately enacted the 
Rules to execute the Act. World Health Organisation described the policies as good, well-
intended and fairly tough on tobacco market. People were happy to see the anti-smoking laws 
and there were no obvious protests against these measures and actions. No reports of major 
issues came up in this period. The Government continued to show their good intention by 
amending the laws and making them tougher for tobacco businesses. Yet, the policies failed 
to achieve the intended targets.      
In this dissertation, I attempt to explain this puzzle by drawing on primary and secondary 
evidence and using a combined framework of political economy and policy implementation 
analysis. Focusing on the analysis of country-level stakeholders and their interests, this study 
finds that the politics of interests and the institutions in implementation process have skewed 
the outcomes.  
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background of tobacco control in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh started to grow tobacco as a food crop in the 1960s. After the country‟s 
liberation, the British American Tobacco (BAT) company financed the extensive cultivation 
of tobacco as an industrial smoking product in the 1970s, especially in the northern part of 
Bangladesh (Hassan et al., 2015 p. 91). The Government termed tobacco a „cash crop‟ and 
due to its profitability, massive production took place in various parts of Bangladesh. The 
country soon became one of the leading tobacco producers in the world around the 1990s. 
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Being one of the most populated countries in the world, the continuous increase of tobacco 
consumption contributed to the rapid growth of the market and industrialisation of tobacco in 
Bangladesh (Efroymson & Ahmed, 2003, p. 15-16).   
The history of tobacco control attempts in Bangladesh is recent. A few civil society 
organisations (CSOs) namely Amran Dhumpan Nibaron Kori (ADHUNIK), Bangladesh 
Cancer Society (BCS) and Non-smokers‟ Forum began to advocate for anti-smoking 
measures in the 1980s. They were not very successful until Bangladesh restored democracy 
in 1991. In 1999 a High Court verdict on the Voyage of Discovery Case
1
 asked the 
Government to stop the aggressive marketing activities of the BAT in Bangladesh (World 
Bank, 1999). A more concerted effort for tobacco control especially from the CSOs was 
visible in the following years.  
Meanwhile in the 1980s and the 1990s tobacco control advocacy was gaining momentum 
globally (Lopez et al., 1994 p. 243). Many global and international organisations mainly led 
by World Health Organisation (WHO) started to advocate for strong tobacco control policy 
measures. These organisations produced evidence on how tobacco was a massive health issue 
causing millions of premature human deaths across the globe (Cairney et. al., 2012, p. 3). The 
World Bank (WB) also played a crucial role in anti-tobacco movement especially by focusing 
on tobacco taxes, affordability and illicit trade of tobacco products (World Bank, 2016). 
Eventually, WHO came up with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC
2
) in 
2003. Having tobacco as one of the leading causes of premature deaths, Bangladesh was the 
first country signed and ratified the Convention in 2004 (Ash, 2016; GATS, 2009; WHO, 
2008: p. 26). This triggered government intervention in the tobacco market. 
According to 2009 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), 43.5% of people aged 15 years 
and above in Bangladesh (i.e. 40.1 million approximately) used to consume tobacco in some 
form or other. WHO reported that 57,000 people die every year out of tobacco-related 
diseases and another 200,000 get paralysed in Bangladesh (NTCC, 2009). The Government 
                                                          
1
 The case involved the use of a touring luxury yacht by British American Tobacco (BAT) to advertise its 
cigarettes. Invoking the right to life and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of Bangladesh, the petitioner 
urged the court to declare advertisement of tobacco products illegal.  In its opinion, the Court recognised the 
harms of smoking and agreed with petitioners that the BAT yacht constituted an “advertisement” and that, more 
broadly, the use of any advertisement for cigarettes without appropriate health warnings offended the 
constitutional right to life. For more details, please visit: 
http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/litigation/decisions/bd-20000207-islam,-et-al.-v.-bangladesh (accessed on 
July 26, 2016) 
2
 The main aim of FCTC is to control tobacco through legislations and policies across the countries. 168 
countries have signed this Convention so far. 
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of Bangladesh (GOB) earns significant revenue
3
 by exporting tobacco leafs as well as by 
taxing tobacco process and consumption (Barkat, 2013 p. 22). About 200,000 people are 
employed in small, medium and national tobacco companies (Barkat, 2013 p. 15) and a lot of 
farmers are engaged in farming tobacco as their only winter crop (Hossain et al., 2013 p. 
128). 
Bangladesh enacted „Smoking and Tobacco Products Usage (Control) Act, 2005‟ (GOB, 
2014) in order to control tobacco production as well as to reduce its consumption. The 
Government immediately prepared National Policy and Plan of Action for Tobacco Control 
(GOB, 2006) and established a separate public organisation „National Tobacco Control Cell‟ 
(NTCC) in 2007 to lead and coordinate the implementation processes. The Government also 
created a national committee and committees at the district and sub-district levels to oversee 
the tobacco control policy implementation. CSOs and anti-smoking activists welcomed the 
firm intention of the Government to control tobacco (Hasib, 2014; Sujon, 2013). 
Twelve years have passed since the policies including the legislation and the Rules took place 
to control tobacco.  The main objectives of these policies stated in the National Policy and 
Plan of Action in 2006 were: (i) to reduce tobacco consumption, (ii) to promote cessation of 
tobacco cultivation (iii) to protect non-smokers from exposure to second-hand smoking, and 
(iv) to prevent people from the devastating consequences of tobacco usage (GOB, 2006, p. 7-
8). The target was to achieve a decrease in per capita tobacco consumption at least by 1% 
every next year (GOB, 2006, p. 8) and to create a tobacco-free Bangladesh
4
 by 2040. 
According to WHO‟s Global Tobacco Epidemic (GTE) Report (2015), in the last twelve 
years, Bangladesh has achieved several targets. First, due to persistent health warnings on 
tobacco packages, people have become more aware of the health hazards of smoking. 
Second, the ban on the promotion and advertisement of tobacco products through mainstream 
means (such as print and electronic media, billboards, and public announcements) has been 
successfully implemented (Tobacco Atlas, 2016; WBB, 2015). Third, the Government has 
increased the revenue generation through taxing on smoking products namely cigarettes and 
bidis. Finally, the policies have legitimised the grounds of raising taxes on tobacco process 
                                                          
3
 According to the annual revenue report of the Ministry of Finance, in the financial year of 2015-16, the 
Government earned more than 14 thousand crores Bangladeshi Taka only from smoking products. 
4
 According to WHO‟s definition, tobacco-free world means to have the world where only less than 5% of adult 
people (aged 15 years or more) shall consume tobacco. As a signatory of FCTC, Bangladesh aims to be a 
tobacco-free by 2040.  
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and products, as well as to take control over cultivation and marketing. However, these 
achievements were not enough to fulfill the objectives of the policies. 
Several studies found that the consumption of tobacco has increased in this period. One study 
conducted in 2010 by the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project (ITCEP) 
revealed that 2.5 million more Bangladeshi people were smoking in 2009 than in 2005. The 
report gave two possible explanations for this result, namely the increase of population and 
the fact that people find it difficult to quit smoking. Its 2011 report claimed that the tobacco 
control Act does not effectively protect the people of Bangladesh from the harms of tobacco 
use and exposure as required by Article 8 of the FCTC (ITCEP, 2016, p. 3). The Tobacco 
Atlas survey in 2013 revealed that the percentage of smoking adult population (aged 15 or 
above) in Bangladesh is 46.4% which is a clear increase than the percentage 46.2 that GATS 
found in 2009. Human Development Research Centre (HDRC) study also recorded the 
highest percentage of tobacco consumption (smoking and smokeless) in Bangladesh in 2013 
(Shoeb, 2013).  
Studies also show that the demand for tobacco products is also on the rise since 2003. Barkat 
et al., (2012) and Nargis et al., (2016) show that the demand for tobacco products increases 
with the increased per capita income in Bangladesh. The supply of tobacco products and the 
cultivation of tobacco have also increased in this period. A survey conducted by Campaign 
for Tobacco-Free Kids revealed that tobacco consumption in Bangladesh sharply rose in 
recent years, with cigarette sales going up by 40% and tobacco use in the form of bidi
5
 
increased by 80% between 1997 and 2010 (Shoeb, 2013). The area of land used for 
cultivating tobacco also rapidly increased. According to the statistics of the Department of 
Agricultural Extension (DAE), tobacco was cultivated in 70,000 hectares of land in the 2012-
2013 farming season while it grew to 108,000 hectares in 2013-2014 (Roy & Zakaria, 2015; 
Masud, 2015). 
The puzzle is, despite having policies including the legislation in place, why did the country 
fail to implement the policies in the way they were intended to? Clearly, the answers lay in 
governance issues surrounding implementation. In the following section, I present a short 
account of the existing literature that explores some of the potential explanations for this 
puzzle.  
                                                          
5
Bidi is a form of filter-less cigar which is made of dry and not-very-processed tobacco. To know more please 
visit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beedi  
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1.2 What does the existing literature say? 
The global views of tobacco control mainly focused on the production and consumption of 
tobacco and the issues of public health generated by it. International organisations mainly led 
by WHO and The Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases (known as The Union) 
have studied the health hazards of first and second-hand tobacco consumptions, while other 
studies including the ones conducted by the WB have concentrated on the market and 
economy of tobacco.  
Mackay and Croftont (1996) analysed the trends of tobacco consumption and control 
measures in developing nations and found that compared to developed countries, more men 
and fewer women were smoking in developing countries, but smoking in women and girls 
was increasing. They also discovered that due to strict laws and policies to control tobacco in 
high-income developed countries, transnational tobacco companies were struggling to 
continue their profits, and were moving their businesses toward low-income developing 
countries. This shift of business of multinational tobacco companies is one of the influencing 
global factors that caused an increase in the cultivation and production of tobacco in countries 
like Bangladesh. However, this does not explain the whole situation. 
Cairney et al. (2012) studied the origins and history of tobacco as well as the politics of 
power and transfers of tobacco control governance in recent times across the countries. Based 
on their review of literature and observations, they argue that it is mainly the national politics 
around tobacco production and processing that shapes the policy outcome in developing 
countries. They also suggested that consideration of how policy gets transferred in a country 
is crucial to gain the full understanding of the scenario in a developing country, and noted 
that tobacco control might be moving more towards global governance in which domestic 
policies of countries were supplemented by international agreements. In the case of 
Bangladesh, this transfer of policies, as mentioned in the previous section, happened through 
FCTC and, later got translated into other legal and institutional measures.  
Bump et al. (2009) reviewed the literature of tobacco control in low and middle-income 
countries and came up with four major conclusions. First, only 16 out of 454 studies of 
tobacco control measures have applied a political economy approach as an analytical 
methodology. Second, the few papers that used the term “political economy” neither 
explicitly conduct this kind of analysis nor directly consider political strategies for advancing 
tobacco control. Third, translating the FCTC in reducing the use of tobacco and defining the 
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appropriate political strategies for tobacco control require national-level political economy 
analyses. Fourth, the present and past of tobacco control are well documented, but analyses 
of future scenarios have mostly focused on projections of health consequences and smoking 
trends, and most of these analyses do not address political and governance strategies to 
control tobacco in low and middle-income countries. It shows the significance of studying the 
political economy of tobacco in Bangladesh from the perspectives of politics and governance.    
In Bangladesh, Efroymson and Ahmed (2003) traced the tobacco control measures before 
FCTC and noted the need for creating political will and agenda for tobacco control. They also 
found that tobacco companies were strong forces in Bangladesh and it would be difficult to 
maintain a spotlight on tobacco in the face of so many competing causes of death and illness 
including floods and cyclones. Based on their findings, they claim that existing tobacco 
control laws (mainly anti-smoking) were not strong enough to cease the aggressive promotion 
of tobacco companies and products. They suggested creating a strong alliance among state 
and non-state forums since at that time only a few CSOs namely Bangladesh Anti-Tobacco 
Alliance (BATA) and World for a Better Bangladesh (WBB) Trust were advocating for 
Government intervention in the tobacco market. Government intervention happened and 
Bangladesh now has a set of anti-tobacco policies and a fairly strong alliance to combat the 
aggression of tobacco companies, but the expected results have not been achieved. Why? 
A number of studies have mainly focused the economic aspects of tobacco in Bangladesh 
namely the tax and price, agriculture, poverty, employment and the market. As an active 
observer, the WB analyses tobacco control in Bangladesh from an economic perspective in 
2004, 2008 and 2013 and identifies raising taxes as the most effective way to reduce tobacco 
use  and single-most cost-effective Government intervention (World Bank, 2013). The 
HDRC studies on tobacco tax and economics led by Barkat (2013) and Barkat et al. (2012) 
explore the structure of tobacco taxes and prices, government interventions, tobacco farming 
and productions, employment, revenue and the demand for tobacco products. These studies 
also identify the tax increase as the most effective way to reduce the demand, and find that 
the existing tax structure and administration are weak to enforce high tax and excise on the 
tobacco products and companies. Barkat et al. (2008) have studied the economy of tobacco 
farming through a political economy framework and have found that tobacco companies 
influence the farmers to increase the cultivation of tobacco. Considering the findings of the 
study, they have observed that there is a need for an alternative to tobacco farming which the 
Government fails to deliver. 
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In order to assess the progress of tobacco control among its member countries, WHO 
prepared its own analytical framework called MPOWER. MPOWER stands for Monitoring 
of tobacco use and prevention policies, Protection of people from tobacco smoke; Offering 
help to quit tobacco use; Warning about dangers of tobacco; Enforcing bans on tobacco 
advertisement, promotion and sponsorship; and Raising tobacco taxes. MPOWER (2008) 
Bangladesh report describes the policies which include the Act, Rules and national strategies 
as „good‟ and identifies some key weaknesses of the policy mainly around the plain 
packaging, tax increase, public awareness and monitoring. 
WHO‟s GTE Report (2015) has used the MPOWER framework to analyse the successes and 
failures of tobacco control policies in its member countries. According to this report, the 
countries that have shown the most success in controlling tobacco are mostly developed 
countries such as Australia and Ireland. The few low-income countries like Bhutan and 
Ghana that are among those that have made considerable success are not much comparable 
with Bangladesh because of their distinctive demographic and socio-political contexts.      
ITCPEP also analyses the impact and progress of the tobacco control policies in Bangladesh 
on a regular basis. This project published its latest study report in June 2015 and showed that 
since 2005 Bangladesh has increased taxes on cigarettes and bidis, improved in restricting 
public smoking, successfully banned the advertisement in mainstream media and amended 
the Act in a stricter way along with a stricter set of Rules (ITCEP, 2016). However, the report 
also notes that the production and consumption of tobacco have increased. 
The above account of literature highlights four major points. First, not many studies have 
attempted to understand the implementation of tobacco control measures from a governance 
perspective in the low-income developing countries like Bangladesh. Second, the literature 
has identified issues around and in governance and policy implementation namely weak tax 
structures and administration, failure of the Government bodies to provide alternatives to 
tobacco to farmers and the monitoring the implementation. Third, the literature does not go 
deep into explaining why the state has failed to address these issues. Fourth, the studies 
mainly offer insights from diverse economic perspectives with little analysis of how key 
stakeholders and their interests affect policy outcome. 
This study attempts to delve deeper into some of the political economy issues that help 
explain the failures in implementation. The following section states and elaborates the key 
questions of this research. 
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1.3 Research questions 
As I discussed in the previous section, the explanations for the increase in tobacco production 
and consumption in Bangladesh remain inadequate. In order to fill this gap, I started the 
research with the main question: why did the tobacco control policies in Bangladesh fail to 
deliver their intended outcomes? 
The answers to this question clearly lay in the implementation period and process. Policy 
implementation not only involves a number of institutions, bodies, agencies and actors in 
various levels of governance but also affects a number of entities who have stakes in the 
tobacco sector of Bangladesh. Thus to understand failures of implementation, one has to 
analyse the interests of the actors that the policies have affected. Besides the monetary profits 
for the tobacco companies, tobacco also produces economic and political interests and 
incentives for the stakeholders. Hence, we need to better understand these stakeholders and 
their interests. 
In order to understand these factors and to operationalise this study, I divide my main 
research question into the following sub-questions: 
a) In what ways do the policies affect the stakeholders and their interests? 
b) How do the institutions and interests shape the implementation process and affect the 
outcome?  
1.4 Focus and scope 
This study brings governance perspectives to this case of implementation failure, which the 
existing literature does not address. Due to the limitation of time and words, I have narrowed 
down the scope of this study in a few ways. Although I noted from the existing literature that 
there are some global factors and interests that may have affected the implementation, I chose 
to focus this research on a country-level analysis. Since the answers to the questions of this 
research lay in the implementation process, I limit the analysis within the implementation 
time frame since 2003 to till date. 
1.5 Organisation of this Paper 
This paper has four chapters. In the introductory chapter, I start with the background of the 
problem and present a short account of literature to justify the purpose of this study. Then I 
introduce the research questions. In the second and third chapter, I discuss my conceptual 
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framework that I shall use to analyse my findings, and elaborate the methods I used in this 
research work respectively. Finally, in chapter four, I present my analysis of the findings to 
explain the puzzle and answer the research questions. In the conclusions, I shall give a short 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the background of the problem, the rationale of this 
study and the questions I seek to answer. From the literature, I recognise that I need a 
framework that would allow me to look into the politics of implementation of these policies. 
The sub-questions seek answers through the game of interests among the stakeholders, actors 
and institutions. Considering these criteria, I prepare a framework (see Figure 1 below) that 
combines the concepts of the Political Economy Analysis (PEA) and the Policy 
Implementation Analysis (PIA). I believe analysing the information through this framework 
shall lead me to explain the puzzles and answer the questions. 
 
Figure 1: The conceptual framework of this study 
The above framework (Figure 1) mainly combines a set of three analytical components of 
PEA (ideas, institutions and interests) identified by Hall (1997) with a set of three 
components of PIA (intent, content and context) identified by Grindle (1980). I explain this 
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2.1 The Political Economy Analysis (PEA) 
PEA mainly focuses on actors, networks, institutions and their competing interests. Hall 
(1997) identifies three basic components of a political economy namely ideas, institutions 
and interests. He argues that analysing these three concepts within an interest-based economy 
provides an understanding of the politics of it. Pettit and Acosta‟s (2014) framework explains 
contemporary PEA through the political dynamics and identifies the significance of two 
common features of PEA. First, the analysis of institutions is important in understanding how 
the social and political institutions shape decisions and outcomes, and reproduce asymmetries 
in order to protect the interests of influential actors. Second, the analysis of individuals 
crucially includes the best interests of individuals (or a group of like-minded actors) which 
could be not only material benefits or awards but also common good or behaviour within the 
setting. The notion of best interest may change with context and over time depending on 
individual‟s compared gains and benefits.  
Hall (1997) notes the significance of ideas to instigate the investigation into an interest-based 
economy. Ideas not only often turn into institutional measures, but can also create public 
discourse and agenda. In the process of policymaking and policy actions, these ideas may 
also affect institutional activity. The interests of the actors (individuals and stakeholders) 
compete against limited resources, and examining the actor‟s behaviour and interests lead to 
the implicit and explicit politics among them. Exploring the game of these interests help to 
understand who wins and who loses. Analysing the activity and effectiveness of the 
institutions can lead to exploring the rules of these games. Thus, tracing and analysing the 
ideas, institutions and interests in a political economy offers explanations and insights to 
understand the questions regarding the politics in and around.         
Tobacco in Bangladesh produces interests and benefits for many actors. Since 2003, the idea 
of government intervention has generated a set of institutions to control tobacco market as 
well as new ideas around tobacco. Analysing the ideas, institutions and interests shall help 
delve into the politics of tobacco control in Bangladesh. 
2.2 Policy implementation Analysis (PIA)  
Policy implementation is a complex process, especially in regards to policies involving goods 
like tobacco, which involves monetary and political shares, benefits and stakes. Meter and 
Horn (1975, p. 448) explicitly define policy implementation as “actions by public or private 
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(individuals or group) directed to the achievements of objectives set forth prior to policy 
decisions”. Referring to Williams (1971), they also note that an inquiry about implementation 
seeks to determine whether an organisation (in this case, the Government) can bring together 
men (individuals and groups) and material (Meter and Horn, 1975 p. 448). They also make a 
clear distinction between policy impact and policy implementation which takes us to the 
focus of this dissertation. 
Considering the politics of policy implementation in developing countries, Grindle (1980) 
points out three aspects of a set of policy which are crucial in this study- intent, content and 
context. Here, intent refers to the political will, mainly the will of the political leaders and 
policy makers; content relates to the type of goods and policy as well as the kind of actors 
involved and interests affected in the decisional units of the policy implementation; and 
contexts reflects the social and political settings where according to Grindle good intentions 
are not enough. Grindle (1980) argues that the politics of policy implementation actually 
begins at the outcome stage when individuals and groups pursue their conflicting interests. I 
shall analyse the policy implementation processes of this case through these three concepts.  
Thus, this study has a two-fold analysis. The analysis of the political economy of tobacco in 
Bangladesh is followed by the analysis of the implementation of the policies. This combined 
framework (Figure 1) shall allow me to examine how the ideas, institutions and interests in 
tobacco control in Bangladesh affect the policy implementation process (intent, content and 
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3. Methodology 
This study is based on data and information collected from primary and secondary sources. I 
operationalised this research by reviewing the policy documents and existing literature, and 
collecting and extracting information from primary sources. 
3.1 Secondary research 
I started by reviewing the policy papers regarding tobacco control in Bangladesh. These 
policy papers mainly include the Acts, laws, Rules, Government orders, action plans and 
FCTC agreement paper. I also reviewed government reports, WHO reports, WB reports, 
reports of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and so forth. Through this analysis, I 
initially found out how these policies affect various actors, groups, and organisations, and 
how they relate to various institutions. Then I tried to find the loopholes in the policies and 
implementation strategies and to connect to my own experience of working in policy 
implementation. I could understand the current discussions, discourses, claims and 
movements around tobacco control. I went through the study and research reports conducted 
by various academic and research bodies, CSOs and activist groups in order to understand the 
current narratives regarding tobacco. I engaged with a body of literature not only relating to 
tobacco control policies in Bangladesh but also about different aspects of local and global 
tobacco control mechanisms. I came across various perspectives to look into tobacco. These 
secondary sources helped me find a small part of the explanation, especially regarding my 
sub-questions, and gave me an idea which questions I should ask my interviewees. 
I focused more on the country-level actors, which allowed me to understand more about the 
national level institutions and political ideas and agenda. I made a list of 10 potential 
interviewees but I was unable to interview one of them. Considering my research question 
and the sub-questions, I prepared questions for my interviewees. Then I proceeded to my 
primary research. 
3.2 Primary research 
3.2.1 My own experience 
I am a civil servant, and I have been working for the Government of Bangladesh since 2011. I 
was involved with the implementation of tobacco control policies in various capacities for 
more than three years. I received two major pieces of training on tobacco control; one was on 
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mobile courts (conducted by NTCC) and another was on the management of tobacco control 
policies (conducted by The Union). In those years, being an executive magistrate, I conducted 
a number of mobile courts in order to stop smoking in public places, and to take punitive 
actions against those who breach the law, as well as to take down the advertisements of 
tobacco products in two districts of Bangladesh. I had also been a member of District Task 
Force Committee (DTFC) for tobacco control in Sirajganj district. While working in those 
capacities I had the opportunity to notice some key implicit and explicit political factors that 
influenced the policy implementation and outcomes. I have experienced how public, private 
and civil society organisations interact to implement a policy in Bangladesh and how in 
reality, the institutional mechanisms are often challenged by implicit and explicit politics 
among the players. My reflections echo when Grindle and Thomas (1989) when they talk 
about bureaucratic politics, state interests, agenda setting and decision making. I recalled my 
memories, reflected on my experiences and used those reflections as primary sources in this 
study. 
3.2.2 Semi-structured qualitative interviews 
I chose to conduct qualitative interviews because I believed that it was the best way to dig 
into the issues and extract insights in a complicated case like tobacco control. I planned to 
interview representatives from all key stakeholders. I already knew some of the senior 
Government officials and members of CSOs who are conscious of these policies and I 
interviewed them. Through one of the interviewees, I also found a former employee of British 
American Tobacco (BAT) Company and a tobacco businessperson. I managed to interview a 
senior journalist and two Members of Parliament (MPs). Thus, the interviews do represent all 
key stakeholders. Although I sent the questions (Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire) to the 
interviewees prior to the sessions, these interviews were semi-structured (Nazneen, 2016; 
Harrell & Bradley, 2009) and more like conversations.  
I took 9 interviews (Appendix 1: list of interviewees) in total. Most of these interviews were 
on the cell phone, and the rest were through online video calls. I have also received a written 
statement from a senior Government official. I asked them questions designed to go deep into 
various aspects of politics regarding tobacco control measures and the policy implementation 
and allowed them to share about any issues outside those questions. As I have worked in this 
sector before, I had an idea which sort of questions would generate the discussions of the 
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issues I was interested in. As almost all of my interviewees asked me not to reveal their 
names, I use pseudonyms in this paper. 
However, there were a few limitations in this method. I interviewed two MPs and due to their 
shortage of time, I could not have a long discussion with them. Also, I was digging into some 
issues that are very sensitive and some of my interviewees, despite giving the assurance that 
their names would not be revealed were not ready to disclose some secrets. I had to pass 
some questions. As I mentioned, I received a written statement from a top official, as he 
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4. Findings and Analysis 
In this chapter, I present the findings and analysis to answer the research questions. After 
analysing the information obtained from reviewing policy papers, reports, interviews and 
reflections on my own experiences, I gained insights and explanations to answer my research 
questions. Through the following sections, I categorically discuss the ideas, institutions and 
interests in and around tobacco control in Bangladesh, and examine how the politics among 
the stakeholders has skewed the outcome of the policies.  
4.1 Key Stakeholders: Who holds the stake? How do they get affected? 
Tobacco, as a cash crop has a long history of industrialisation and consumption in 
Bangladesh. Since the government intervention took place in the market in 2003, several 
bodies and institutions were set up to implement the policies to control tobacco. Currently, 
tobacco control involves a number of key stakeholders and it affects almost everyone in the 
country. After a desk review of the Act, Rules, FCTC documents, policy papers, study and 
Government orders, I prepared the following table stating the major national level players in 
the tobacco sector of Bangladesh. 
  Stakeholders 
State Legislative bodies (Lawmakers), NTCC, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary 
Affairs, Ministry of Health and Family Planning Affairs, Ministry of finance, 
The Ministry of Public Administration, The Ministry of Information, Local 
Government Bodies, The District Magistracy, The Judiciary, National and 
local committees,  Law enforcing agencies, Public place authorities 
Market Local small and medium tobacco companies, National and multi-national 
tobacco companies, Farmers, Businessperson, Consumers, Smokers, Workers 
and employees of tobacco companies, Business owners/shareholders 
Society Civil society organizations, NGOs, Media and journalists, Non-smokers and 
Non-consumers, Common People, Activists, Health professionals, Political 
leaders, Private authorities (such as privately owned public bus owners) 
Table 1: National level stakeholders of tobacco control in Bangladesh 
I separated the stakeholders (Table 1) in three broad sectors- state, market and society to 
provide an explanation how the policies affect these players. However, the interests of these 
stakeholders often overlap. The state agencies are in charge of leading the policy 
implementation but the conflicts of interests lay within them. Several studies point out that 
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The introduction of tobacco control policies affected a number of state bodies in Bangladesh. 
Legislative bodies and the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLPA) are directly 
involved in making and amending the Act and Rules. The policies gave the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) an opportunity to generate more revenue from the sector while the Ministry of 
Health and Family Planning (MoHFP) has the responsibility to lead the implementation and 
to make sure that this extra revenue is spent in improving tobacco-related health services. 
National Tobacco Control Cell (NTCC) along with the national committee for tobacco 
control is in charge of overseeing the implementation. The Ministry of Information (MoI) is 
responsible for creating awareness through disseminating relevant messages, especially 
health warnings; the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) is to provide alternatives to tobacco 
farming and supports to farmers, and the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE) takes 
care of the workers in the sector. The district magistracy, judiciary and law enforcing 
agencies collaborate to make public places free of smoking and tobacco promotions.  
Several studies (Barkat, 2008, 2013; Peiris, 2013; Hassan et al., 2015) pointed out that the 
government interventions affected almost all entities in the tobacco market chain, from 
suppliers to consumers. The intervention comprised of banning and restricting policies of 
tobacco usage in the country (Mursalin et al., 2013, p. 326). The ban on the promotion and 
advertisement has put a limit to tobacco businesses and has affected advertising companies 
and media. The policies aim to reduce the tobacco cultivation which affects the farmers as 
well as the tobacco companies that buy tobacco leafs from the farmers through contract
6
 
farming. The obligatory pictorial health warning messages on the packages and the ban on 
smoking in public places threaten the sale of tobacco products. The attempts to cease the 
tobacco production and process also threaten the employment of farmers, workers, and 
tobacco businesses.  The policies impose a tax on tobacco sale and raise the price each year 
which affects the tobacco users, tobacco company owners, businesses and the shareholders. 
Non-users including adults and children are, however, positively affected, as the ban on the 
smoking in public places protectss them from second-hand smoking. CSOs, NGOs, activists 
and local political leaders also get the opportunity to participate in the implementation of the 
policies.  
 
                                                          
6
 Contract Farming is a form credit agreement between the tobacco companies and farmers. The tobacco 
companies offer advance credits to the farmers for cultivating tobacco. After harvest, the farmers have to sell the 
tobacco leafs at a price agreed during the credit agreement. For details please see Barkat (2008). 
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4.2 Ideas: Tobacco control, smoking and public support  
In a political economy, as Hall (1997) and Hay (2004) argue, ideas play a major role in 
setting a political agenda. Although a few organisations had been advocating for anti-
smoking laws in Bangladesh, the government intervention was a foreign idea imported into 
the country in the early 2000s. As Sujon Mahmud, one of my interviewees who has been an 
activist for creating a tobacco-free world for more than 15 years, believes that the idea of 
tobacco control came neither from the society nor from the state. There were basically two 
arguments, he added; one was from the economists (mainly led by the World Bank) who 
argued that along with tax and foreign exchange, tobacco also generates negative externalities 
including damaging our health and environment; another was from the few CSOs and NGOs 
(funded and influenced by foreign organisations such as WHO) who campaigned for anti-
smoking regulations to improve public health.The idea of tobacco control has neither been a 
politically supported one nor become a popular public agenda.  
Tobacco control fails to be a sustained public agenda. Generally, it is the mass media that not 
only sets the agenda but also facilitates the public discussions around it. However, there is 
little and inconsistent media coverage on tobacco-related issues. Interviewee Shirin Bokul, a 
senior journalist, says, „we only see news and discussions every year in the financial budget 
period because tobacco tax is a big issue. But the media, whether it is private or state-owned, 
does not seem much interested in tobacco.‟ Although “smoking is bad”, “Smoking kills” and 
“Smoking causes cancer” are acknowledged by everyone, the fact that smoking does not kill 
people immediately makes it perceived as less severe by the public, especially in comparison 
to other disasters that cause instantaneous deaths such as road accidents and cyclones.  
Interviewee Sujon Mahmud points out that by “tobacco” most people still mean smoking 
only. Although the tobacco control policies in Bangladesh formally originated from the 
FCTC, the policies were transferred from high income developed countries where people 
hardly use non-smoking products. Hence, the majority of the tobacco control measures deal 
with the smoking products. The policies hardly address non-smoking products of tobacco. 
Tobacco control in Bangladesh remains an importan idea that deals predominantly with 
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4.3 Institutions: Activity and effectiveness  
The institutions related to tobacco in Bangladesh can also mainly be separated into three 
broad categories: state, market and society. Most of the state institutions (e.g. written laws 
and regulations, state and government bodies and the committees) are not active enough to be 
effective in this case. Interviewee Meher Akhter, who has been working in NTCC for three 
years, states that NTCC is underfunded despite being the agency in charge to implement the 
tobacco control policies. She adds, NTCC mainly imparts training to government officials 
and holds seminars to create awareness among civil society members. She also confirmed 
that the meetings of the national committee are held irregularly. If I reflect on my own 
experience of being a member of district committee for tobacco control, I did not see any 
meeting being held at my workplace. Barkat (2008) also spotted the inactivity of state 
institutions by pointing out that Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) failed to 
provide the farmers with alternatives to tobacco farming. Among the government bodies, the 
MoF is fairly active in raising and collecting taxes from the tobacco companies, businesses 
and consumers. The district administration and district magistracy are active as they can earn 
revenue through conducting mobile courts and collecting fines from the individuals who 
smokes in public places and the companies that breach the law. 
Despite state interventions, the market institutions are operating effectively. As the demand 
for tobacco leafs and products is increasing, tobacco companies continue contract farming 
with tobacco farmers in order to increase cultivation and production. This explains the failure 
of DAE in providing farmers with an alternative to tobacco farming. For instance, Chandan 
Barua, a former employee of BAT, shares how he and his team used to promote tobacco 
products through alternative ways including product promotion
7
 and placement in films and 
open air concerts. Several reports confirm his claim that tobacco companies, especially the 
local ones with the assistance from local political leaders, offer interest-free credits for 
contract farming (Barkat, 2008; Gomez, 2014; Progga, 2015). Studies also show that despite 
the annual price rise caused by tax rise, the consumption of tobacco did not decrease because 
it does not much effectively increase real price
8
 (Barkat, 2013). Nargis et al. (2016) also 
show that despite the increase in price, the smoking products in Bangladesh are still very 
                                                          
7
 Buyers often get lottery coupon upon the purchase of a certain number of packs of products. Tobacco 
Industries Watch (TIW) collects news reports regarding these alternative promotions. These reports can be 
accessed at http://www.tobaccoindustrywatchbd.org/article 
8
 Barkat (2013) studied the effects of tax and price rise on the smoking commodities and found that the increase 
of price, considering the annual inflation and increase of average per capita income, is very negligible. That is 
why; the price rise hardly affects the sale of smoking products.     
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much affordable. The impact of the ban on advertisement has also limited effect on market 
institutions. Tobacco companies continue to make profits by increasing the price of tobacco 
products and pay the increased tax. Consumers still have diversely priced products in various 
forms to purchase- cheap, medium and costly (DT, June 23, 2015). Thus, the state 
interventions are not causing many struggles to the market institutions. 
The CSOs and NGOs continue to advocate for tobacco control in Bangladesh with little 
tangible outcomes. They also continue to be part of the Government-led tobacco control 
bodies and committees but have failed to put much pressure on the state and market 
institutions. Interviewee Mahbubul Karim (MP) thinks that the activities of NGOs and CSOs 
are contradictory, as, on one hand, they call for tax rise, but on the other hand, they also 
demand to limit the businesses of tobacco companies. The CSOs and NGOs do not seem to 
have the power neither to challenge the inactivity of state institutions nor to break the market 
status quo. Interviewee Hasan Sarker, a government employee at a District Administration, 
thinks that the policies have affected the social norms of public smoking in a contradictory 
manner because public smoking is banned, but at the same time, there are designated places 
to smoke in public places. 
Hence, the economy of tobacco is quite vibrant. Most of the state institutions are neither 
active nor effective. The Government is only active in taxing the products, which has also 
proved not very effective to control the market. Market institutions especially the businesses 
around tobacco are very active and working well to continue making a profit. The activity of 
civil society institutions is not powerful enough to create any tangible impact. 
4.4 Interests: who wins, who loses? 
According to political economy analysis, as Hall (1997) and Pettit and Acosta (2014, p. 14) 
notes, understanding the winning losing game is always a key to go deep into an interest-
based economy which most of the earlier studies did not focus on. International organizations 
mainly the World Bank, WHO and The Union funded the studies on tobacco control. These 
studies, without exploring the rule of the game, implicitly identified the tobacco companies as 
winners. I found that the Government is also a clear winner in this case as it earns a lot of 
revenue through taxing tobacco. In contrast to that, Abdus Samad, a senior Government 
official revealed that the Government hardly increases the budget to create health services to 
cure tobacco-related illness meaning that the revenue gets spent as per the Government‟s 
interests and choice. Businessperson Abdul Karim claims that the consumers and users do not 
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need to increase their financial budget for tobacco as they still have options to go for cheap 
products. These cheap products are more harmful to health. Hence, they lose the quality of 
their health anyway. CSOs and NGOs get funds to continue their campaigns and lobby for 
more legislative and policy actions against tobacco (Hasib, 2015). Non-users of tobacco 
suffer badly as they get exposed to second-hand smoking as a lot of people smoke open 
places. Ullah et al., (2013) and several interviewees inform that the Government failed to 
make the public places smoke-free. It badly affects the public health and environment. 
Farmers continue to grow tobacco as a cash crop. They often get a tobacco-related illness. 
Tobacco farming causes environmental damages. Interviewee Shirin Bokul identifies that 
media do not see tobacco as a big issue; interviewee Chandan Barua says that the tobacco 
companies offer monetary and non-monetary incentives (e.g. gifts, sponsored travels etc.) to 
keep the journalists away from reporting about tobacco. 
Investigating the interests explored more politics in this case. This politics among the 
stakeholders has two faces: the conflict of interests and the coalition of interests. First, 
Interests of different ministries and individuals conflict and confront each other. The MoF 
wants to generate more revenue through the production of tobacco; the MoHFPA treats this 
production as a threat to public health, while the MoLE wants to conserve the employment of 
people in this sector. As Sujon Mahmud says, „A minister when he was in charge of MoFPA 
tried hard to implement these policies, and later when he became the Finance Minister, he 
became totally indifferent to the same issues.‟ These conflicts of interests depict that the 
Government efforts to control tobacco are neither clear nor harmonious. The conflict of 
interests is also present among the tobacco companies. In Bangladesh, in terms of the 
production, the leading national tobacco companies are BAT, The Dhaka Tobacco Ltd and 
Akij Group, while many small tobacco companies operate at a local level. Interviewee 
Chandan Barua gives a crucial insight into the competition in the market among the 
companies and their shareholders. He says the national companies find it difficult to get into 
village level tobacco markets because these small companies are mostly owned by the local 
political leaders. 
Second, state interests often merge with business interests. Some of the members of the 
governing bodies of two largest tobacco companies, BAT and the Dhaka Tobacco Ltd. are 
political leaders and top Government officials. For instance, the governing body of BAT 
contains four representing members from the Government. These four persons are 
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 of different ministries. As one senior Government official explains that the idea 
behind holding these positions is not only to create bridges between the Government and big 
private sector but also to help the companies operate within the guidelines set by the policies. 
On the contrary, Sujon Mahmud claims that the companies earlier used their political 
influence and unethical means to help these four persons to become the Secretaries in the key 
ministries. When they became Secretaries as well as the members of the governing body, the 
companies push their interest through these Government officials. Earlier this year an online 
newspaper reported that the secretary of the MoHFPA opposed the idea of putting the 
pictorial health warnings on the tobacco packs (Bdnews24, June 15, 2016). This clearly 
supports Sujon Mahmud‟s claim and shows how various interests come together and make 
coalition in this case. 
The silence of the political leaders in tobacco issues proves that they may have to lose 
something if they speak up. A few of my interviewees mention that some political leaders, 
including MPs are the owners and shareholders of tobacco companies. This generates 
conflicts as well as a coalition of interests and affects the implementation which I shall 
discuss in the next section. 
4.5 Politics of policy implementation: Intent, Content and Context 
The analysis of the ideas, institutions and interests in the previous sections discovers that 
despite a set of good and well-intended policies in place, games did not much change for the 
key stakeholders especially for tobacco companies and farmers. Key state institutions are 
inactive and not effective. This takes to us to the fact that the problems and the politics lay in 
the implementation phase. In this section, I am going to analyse how these ideas, institutions 
and interests around tobacco affected the implementation process and policy outcome. 
4.5.1 Intent: Lack of will and commitment 
Grindle (1980) argues that the political intent is the key to implementing a policy in a low-
income developing country. The evidences suggest that the political intent and commitment 
are lacking in this case. Nasiruddin Ahmed, former Chairman of National Board of Revenue 
(NBR) in Bangladesh in one of his public lectures in 2011 revealed that just before the yearly 
budget parliamentary session, 120 MPs wrote Demi-official (DO) letters addressing the 
                                                          
9
 Sectary is the most senior position in a ministry for a non-elected bureaucrat in Bangladesh. S/he is the Chief 
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Finance Minister asking not to raise taxes on tobacco products (Ahmed, 2012). As MP 
Meherun Islam says, „I believe we should control tobacco, but at the same time, we also need 
to understand that many of our people are working in these companies.‟ In regard to this, 
Chandan Barua said that each year the tobacco companies spend a lot of money to purchase 
valuable gifts for the MPs for getting these DO letters written and sent to the finance minister 
and some top level bureaucrats. Sujon Mahmud claims that the number of these DO letters 
has increased in last few years. These lawmakers (MPs) approved the amendments to the 
tobacco control Act in 2013 which made the law more strict for tobacco companies (Peiris, 
2013). This means that the policy makers despite making tough tobacco control laws, do not 
actually hold the intent to implement. Several interviewees claim that the political leaders 
sometimes use competing problems like natural disasters to distract the attention of the 
people and sometimes use potential unemployment problem as a shield.  
Both Meher Akhter and Sujon Mahmud confirm that the Government is not interested in 
assessing the policy implementation progress. NTCC only compiles the reports of the number 
of mobile courts conducted in the country and the amount of money they generated. The 
monitoring national committee do not hold meetings regularly. Many ministers and policy 
makers still smoke in official and unofficial public gatherings (DT, January 28, 2014). In 
2014, media caught the former social welfare minister smoking while attending as the chief 
guest of a state function. The political leaders, as many of the interviews mention, still use 
smoking and chewing tobacco products in political campaigns and elections.   
Based on the evidence, I can make three points here. First, as tobacco control is an imported 
idea and it failed to achieve much public support, the elected political leaders do not see any 
political incentives in implementing the policies. The failure of implementation creates some 
activities in CSOs but these irregular activities hardly affect the Government. Second, many 
of the policymakers and political leaders have monetary interests in tobacco businesses. The 
intent of these policymakers is dominant as Sujon Mahmud mentions that the few MPs who 
talk in favour of tobacco control fail to get support neither from their colleagues nor from the 
public. Third, the lack of intent and commitment has affected implementation agencies all 
over the country and created a discourse among these agencies that these policies are not 
meant to be implemented. Thus, the policies remain contained in paper and in some 
ceremonial activities including the celebration of World No Tobacco Day
10
. 
                                                          
10
 WHO celebrates World No Tobacco Day on 31
st
 May every year among the countries that signed FCTC. 
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4.5.2 Content: Issues in implementation 
The game of interests and institutions that I discussed earlier has affected the field level 
implementing agencies. The absence of political leadership and lack of commitment towards 
tobacco control have turned into politics and failure in implementation. The policies fail to 
bring men and groups together towards the directed goals and objectives that Meter and Horn 
(1975) argue to be crucial in making an implementation success.  
As interviewee Hasan Sarkar, who is currently a member of district committee for tobacco 
control confirms that he does not see much of the activities of this committee. Every month 
the chair of the committee receives a letter of instruction from NTCC asking for the reports of 
mobile courts and fines. The implementation of the policies majorly depends on these field 
level committees as they have been assigned three major tasks- (i) to coordinate all 
government agencies to focus on their respective tasks to control tobacco, (ii) to discourage 
local farmers to cultivate tobacco and prepare regular assessment report and (iii) to conduct 
punitive actions against those who breach the law.  
The task force committees are deactivated due to four major reasons. First, a lot of members 
of these committee who are either bureaucrats or civil society members are smokers and 
tobacco users and do not have the moral strength to fight against tobacco. I have witnessed 
that in many state and government functions, tobacco (with betel nuts) is officially offered to 
the guests. Second, the national committee that is supposed to direct the local committees, as 
I mentioned earlier, are also not very active. The top level bureaucrats who work at the office 
of the Prime Minister and the President, as Sujon Mahmud and one senior Government 
official claim, receives cigarette cartoons as gifts every month from tobacco companies. 
Third, the Deputy Commissioner (DC) heads the committee for tobacco control at the district 
level. As a designated member-sectary of the committee, the District Civil Surgeon (DCS) is 
supposed to call the meetings. Hasan Sarker reveals that DCS does not want to call a meeting 
under the supervision of same ranked district officer, DC. Fourth, as Hasan Sarkar adds, the 
District Development Committee (DDC), which is a core committee for implementing 
development plans and projects thinks that the law enforcing agencies should focus on drugs 
like Heroine and Fencidyl, not on tobacco. Because most of the members of DDC think that 
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Grindle (1980) argue that the success or failure of policy implementation in achieving the 
targeted outcome also depends on the kind of actors and stakeholders it involves. As I 
discussed above and showed in Table 1, the tobacco control policies involve various kinds of 
actors and affect everyone in the country. The game of interests among these stakeholders is 
very complicated. Interviewee Hasan Sarker shares a story. He conducted a mobile court and 
punished a local tobacco company with a fine of 1500 US dollars approximately for 
breaching the law.The review authority of the court, District Magistrate (DM) immediately 
received phone calls from the local Member of Parliament (MP) as well as from a national 
television (TV) actor both asking for reducing the amount of fine. The crucial point in this 
story is that MP represents the Legislative, DM represents the Executive, Sarker represents a 
part of Judiciary and the TV actor represents the Society, and the tobacco company represents 
the market. This tells us that how complicated it can be. It is easy to exert a policy decision 
but when all interests converge together and against, it seems hard for some to continue a 
fight. 
Due to the issues in implementation, the interests of the stakeholders prevail, and the 
implementation suffer. The policies do not deliver their intended outcome. 
4.5.3 Context: Socio-political settings 
Grindle (1980, p 14) states, „good intentions may count for little if those responsible for 
various policies or programs are unable to control their pursuits‟. In this case, although the 
policies have good intentions, but the individuals and actors who are responsible for 
implementing, as I explained earlier, are pursuing their interests and competing for access to 
resources and benefits. If I reflect on my own experiences, I can recall memories of observing 
some implicit politics which none of my interviewees talks about. While working as a 
member of the implementation team, I observed an implicit agreement between the local 
political leaders who have shares in tobacco businesses and those who are responsible for 
implementing the policies. The agreement was to not taking too many actions against local 
tobacco companies and businesses.  
Another key factor that Grindle (1980) mentions, is the type of regime. The current 
Government in Bangladesh came to power in 2014 through a controversial election in which 
the main opposition party did not participate, and out of 300 MPs, more than half (154) were 
elected unchallenged, without any contest (Ahmed, 2014). The Government took charge with 
a long term plan „Vision 2020‟ which is a political commitment to take the country into the 
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club of middle-income states by extensive economic developments. MP Mahbubul Karim 
admits that the Government now focuses more on increasing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
through maximising the employment and production. This shows that the current regime 
continuously seeks economic development and has achieved tangible growth to showcase 
before people. In this setting, this regime is not likely to force many struggle on the tobacco 
companies. As I discussed early, the interests of the policymakers favour the tobacco 
businesses. 
The actors from the society including the CSOs and NGOs are active but do not have the 
power to fight against the coalition of political interests and commitments. Tobacco 
companies continue to generate profits and therefore have the power to spend money to 
influence the implementation processes. Hasan Sarkar says that many people in Bangladesh 
believe that smoking helps them to relieve stress. People in the villages traditionally consume 
tobacco in different forms like zarda
11
, gul, sadapata, and do not see it as a bad thing, he 
adds. Due to these social and cultural factors, non-smoking tobacco remains unaddressed.  
Thus, the socio-political settings have affected the implementation and skewed the outcome. 
4.6 Supplementary findings and scope of further research 
In the previous sections, I have presented my key findings and analyses to explain the puzzle 
why despite having the policies in place, Bangladesh was not able to control tobacco. 
Through this study, I also found some additional findings that do not fit the scope and 
framework of this research. I can mention a few of them here so that further studies can 
attempt to focus on these issues.  
First, I found some individuals who have multiple identities in the society, and they use 
different institutional identity to pursue their interests from tobacco control measures. 
Second, the culture of tobacco consumption in Bangladesh is embedded in the society. The 
policies hardly address this tobacco culture. Finally, the Government, as well as a few NGOs 
claims that tobacco control measures as a success in Bangladesh. I found that although the 
policies have created an impact and been effective to implement the ban on advertisements 
and promotion through mainstream media, this is a failure case. Further analysis can be 
brought to this point through other perspectives.   
                                                          
11
 Zarda, gul, sadapata are chewing tobacco products. 
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5.  Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I focused on the politics of the country-level stakeholders and their 
interests in tobacco control measures in Bangladesh since 2003. Through the analyses, I 
explained why tobacco control policies in Bangladesh failed to achieve their intended 
outcomes.  
Firstly, I analysed the ideas around tobacco control and found that the idea of Government 
intervention in the tobacco market was imported to Bangladesh through WHO‟s Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control in 2003. The idea failed to generate much public support, 
and could not become a sustained political agenda as most people perceive tobacco as 
smoking only, and smoking is perceived to be less life-threatening and more useful to relieve 
stress. The Government does not find any political incentives in implementing the policies. 
The implementation lacked the political will and commitment and failed to deliver. 
Secondly, the institutions that were created through the interventions since 2003 have mostly 
been inactive. State institutions failed to affect market institutions. Due to the failure of 
Government bodies and mechanisms, farmers continue to increase tobacco farming. The 
annual tax rise failed to create an impact on the consumption. Tobacco business continues to 
make profits. The Government failed to take control over the market. 
Thirdly, the politics of tobacco control lay in the game of interests as well as in the 
implementation mechanisms. The major winners of the game of interests are the Government 
and the tobacco companies as both of these players continue to make monetary and political 
benefits. The interests of the policymakers, top bureaucrats and tobacco business owners also 
merge to create benefits for these winning players. The smokers and tobacco users lose the 
quality of their health, and non-users continue to get exposed to second-hand smoking. Those 
who are powerful in the system continue to generate and share benefits. 
Fourthly, the implementation of the policies suffers from complicated politics of all types of 
interest-driven actors. Implicit agreements between the political institutions and the state 
bodies including the core responsible committees make the whole implementation process 
paralysed. The political leaders and the bureaucrats use competing priorities like natural 
disasters to distract the attention of the people. They also use the problem of potential 
unemployment as their shields in tobacco control case. 
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Finally, the socio-political context hinders the implementation process. The donor-funded 
NGOs continue to campaign for tougher policies. Although the CSOs are parts of the 
implementation committees, they do not seem powerful enough to affect the political 
commitment. Although being aware of the harmful effects of tobacco consumption, people do 
not seem much concerned. Tobacco also serves the current Government‟s interest of 
increasing growth through maximising production and employment. The Government sees 
tobacco as more of a source of revenue than a problem of public health.  
In a word, the struggle for resources and benefits among the stakeholders in tobacco control 
in Bangladesh has failed the policies to achieve their intended outcomes. If this 
implementation failure continues, creating a tobacco-free Bangladesh by 2040 will remain a 
mere dream.  
The findings of this study and the arguments I made in this paper are crucial in three major 
points. First, they bring new and varied governance perspective to understand the issues 
around tobacco control in Bangladesh. Second, they provide insights of the games of interests 
which help to understand an interest-based economy like tobacco. Third, they have 
implications for studying the case of policy success and failure in the low and middle-income 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees (Pseudonyms) 
1. Abdus Samad, Secretary, Ministry of Information, Government of Bangladesh 
2. Sujon Mahmud, Work for Better Bangladesh, (NGO) and Tobacco Expert 
3. Chandan Barua, Former employee of British American Tobacco Ltd. 
4. Meherun Islam, Member of Parliament, Bangladesh 
5. Hasan Sarker, Assistant Commissioner, District Administration, Khulna 
6. Shirin Bokul, Journalist, Prothom Alo, Bangladesh 
7. Abdul Karim, Businessperson, Medium Enterprise, Sirajganj, Bangladesh 
8. Mahbubul Karim, Member of Parliament 
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Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire 
Questionnaire for MA Dissertation: Tobacco Control Politics in Bangladesh 
Date: June 13, 2016 
Category: District Committee for Tobacco Control (Local Political Representative) 
Name: Abdul Karim (Pseudonym) 
Sex: Male 
Age: 43 
Address:  Sirajganj, Bangladesh 
Political Positions: Vice President, District Awami League, Bangladesh 
Questions 
1. How many years have you been involved with politics?  
2. Have you ever participated in any election? How many? Are they local, regional or national? 
3. How often do you participate in election and political campaigns? 
4. Are you a smoker? 
5. Have you heard about the tobacco control? (If yes) Can you tell us more about it? 
6. Do you go to any meeting regarding tobacco at any Government office? (If yes) How often? 
Why? Where? 
7. What roles do you play in the district to control tobacco? How do you do that? 
8. Why do you think the Government (or you as a member of District Committee) have failed to 
control tobacco? 
9. Do you think that tobacco is an addiction? If yes, why do we not call it a drug? 
10. We see many of the political leaders are against tobacco-control; especially they do not want 
the Government to raise a tax on tobacco. What is your say on that? 
11. We also see a lot of political campaigns, especially the elections use bidis and cigarettes for 
the voters. What do you think about it? 
12. Have you ever met a tobacco farmer? What do you think about them? 
13. What do you think about this tobacco control? What roles political leaders play here? 
14. Do you have any ideas regarding tobacco control policy of the Government? 
15. What are the main reasons, in your opinion, the Government is not being able to control 
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